As Russia bombs Ukrainian cities, we face the reality of what decades of shrinking civic space and rollbacks of fundamental freedoms in the region mean for democracy and security.

By Maria Dahle, Director, Human Rights House Foundation

In October, HRHF published the Crisis Point in Russia report looking at the state of Russian civil society and repeated our warning that Russia’s increasingly dire human rights crisis is spilling - or being exported - beyond its borders. Today, with the intensification of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and dramatic domestic repression in Russia and Belarus, we face existential questions. Nevertheless, against this backdrop we are also reminded that a strong and vibrant civil society and independent media serve as a bulwark for democracy and human rights.

Today’s security and human rights crisis in Eastern Europe is a result, at least in part, of two decades of increasingly dire attacks on civil society, human rights, and human rights defenders by authoritarian actors and an insufficient response from the international community.  In the region, many authorities have erected domestic policies which effectively ban all forms of peaceful protest, severely limit freedom of expression, delegitimize and liquidate civil society organisations unwilling to kowtow to the authorities, and shutter independent media. In general, they seek to silence dissent, and those exposing corruption and other abuses of power. Internationally,  the same states promote a democratic facade to gain legitimacy and then use that legitimacy and a consensus-based international rulebook to promote undemocratic principles and values in multilateral bodies. Parallel to this, they’ve employed old-fashioned corruption and found useful allies amongst the West’s political extremes to build and curry favour. It is past time for democratic states to fully recognise these trends and harness the tools and resources at their disposal to stand up for human rights and reverse these trends.

Ukraine should be a case study in what independent civil society can mean for human rights and democracy. Twice in nearly two decades, independent civil society has been at the forefront of political revolutions which pushed back against illiberalism. Since Russia’s invasion of Crimea, human rights defenders and civil society have sought to document human rights violations, protect human rights defenders, and keep international attention on the plight of political activists, Crimean Tatars, and others facing incredible repression by Russian authorities. Civil society actors have gone into government and contributed to important democratic gains, particularly since Euromaidan in 2014. Today, independent civil society is mobilised to provide humanitarian aid, supplement government services, document war crimes, crimes against humanity, serve as watchdog on domestic affairs and advocate internationally. In Ukraine, civil society is truly a bulwark for human rights.

But independent civil society is not enough. Donor states and others must support efforts to protect civic space, and encourage the participation of independent civil society, particularly where civic space was reduced due to Covid-19.  We must develop and employ new rhetoric against illiberal voices: those who clamp down on human rights and basic freedoms are not “strongmen”. They have purchased their legitimacy and credibility and employ the tools of the state to maintain their own power and enrich themselves. Domestically,  democracies must develop legislative responses to the increasingly cynical use of judicial systems to stifle independent civil society; namely, the introduction of restrictive laws and the use of strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs). SLAPPs are the result of illiberal and well-resourced actors’ efforts to drown out independent civil society and critical voices and must be addressed.

The authoritarian leaders across the region fear the rule of law, independent civil society and media, free and fair elections, the cornerstones of a democracy. Their power can not exist where these guarantors of human rights flourish. Independent civil society and media is a bulwark for human rights and must be protected and promoted.

In 2021, we saw a further worsening of the human rights situation in many countries and a mounting pressure on human rights defenders across the regions where we work. Harassment, smear campaigns, persecution and physical attacks are  common and on the rise.

To understand how to best meet the growing protection needs of human rights defenders, HRHF published in 2021 “Protecting Defenders” report as a tool for organisations providing protection for human rights defenders at risk, as well as for States and donors wishing to align their protection support with local needs. The report, based upon interviews conducted with over 200 HRDs, “maps” protection infrastructure for human rights defenders (HRDs) at risk in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Ukraine.  

The report concludes that protection infrastructure is strong yet not without gaps. The data shows that protection needs of vulnerable groups such as LGBTQI rights activists and gender equality defenders, as well as environmental activists, journalists and HRDs operating in remote areas are insufficiently met.

"States, institutions, organisations and the broader civil society must continue spreading the knowledge about the importance of human rights defenders; we must seek new partnerships and turn bystanders into allies so that defenders can do their work free from reprisals."

Mary Lawlor, UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of Human Rights Defenders

Particularly worrying is the finding that the risks faced by human rights defenders in semi-democratic (hybrid) states – Armenia, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan and pre-invasion Ukraine – are on the rise and warrant immediate attention and action. In these countries human rights defenders are primarily targeted by non-state actors, which are often emboldened, encouraged and supported by the governments. Under such circumstances, protection support provided by civil society is often the only help available to defenders at risk. The report also shows that in authoritarian states - Belarus, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan - the authorities themselves stand behind the threats and attacks on human rights defenders.  

As the human rights situation continues to deteriorate and more and more defenders risk their safety and lives, expanded and strengthened support is the only response.  It is through collaboration and joint efforts that the negative trends can be countered. What civil society needs more than ever is an even stronger commitment from states to support human rights defenders so that they can carry out their legitimate work and protect and promote the rights of others. Furthermore, joint efforts of all stakeholders are needed to ensure that defenders at risk have the support that they need.

To understand how to best meet the growing protection needs of human rights defenders, HRHF published in 2021 “Protecting Defenders” report as a tool for organisations providing protection for human rights defenders at risk, as well as for States and donors wishing to align their protection support with local needs. The report, based upon interviews conducted with over 200 HRDs, “maps” protection infrastructure for human rights defenders (HRDs) at risk in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Ukraine.  

The report concludes that protection infrastructure is strong yet not without gaps. The data shows that protection needs of vulnerable groups such as LGBTQI rights activists and gender equality defenders, as well as environmental activists, journalists and HRDs operating in remote areas are insufficiently met.

"States, institutions, organisations and the broader civil society must continue spreading the knowledge about the importance of human rights defenders; we must seek new partnerships and turn bystanders into allies so that defenders can do their work free from reprisals."

Mary Lawlor, UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of Human Rights Defenders

Particularly worrying is the finding that the risks faced by human rights defenders in semi-democratic (hybrid) states – Armenia, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan and pre-invasion Ukraine – are on the rise and warrant immediate attention and action. In these countries human rights defenders are primarily targeted by non-state actors, which are often emboldened, encouraged and supported by the governments. Under such circumstances, protection support provided by civil society is often the only help available to defenders at risk. The report also shows that in authoritarian states - Belarus, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan - the authorities themselves stand behind the threats and attacks on human rights defenders.  

As the human rights situation continues to deteriorate and more and more defenders risk their safety and lives, expanded and strengthened support is the only response.  It is through collaboration and joint efforts that the negative trends can be countered. What civil society needs more than ever is an even stronger commitment from states to support human rights defenders so that they can carry out their legitimate work and protect and promote the rights of others. Furthermore, joint efforts of all stakeholders are needed to ensure that defenders at risk have the support that they need.

In 2021, we saw a further worsening of the human rights situation in many countries and a mounting pressure on human rights defenders across the regions where we work. Harassment, smear campaigns, persecution and physical attacks are  common and on the rise.

One of the foundations of the human rights movement is the concept of universality. It is central to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and foundational to the system designed to protect and promote human rights.

Human beings are endowed with rights because they are human and those rights are to be protected regardless of particular individual characteristics. Yet, illiberal voices seek to attack the universality of human rights.

Russia is one of a handful of states seeking to undermine international human rights bodies, mechanisms, norms, and standards by challenging the universality of human rights, the bedrock of international human rights law. Russia works with and through non-state actors, including the Russian Orthodox Church (Moscow patriarchy) to promote narratives around “traditional values” at home and beyond its borders. Russia systematically introduces language to weaken international human rights standards and norms. In 2012 and 2017, Russia tabled resolutions at the Human Rights Council which promoted “traditional values” and was widely considered an implicit attack on universalism. Equally troubling, between Russia rejoining the Human Rights Council in an uncontested election 2020 and its suspension by the UN General Assembly in April 2021, it tried to thwart meaningful action on everything from Belarus to Hong Kong.

China is another illiberal voice contributing to attacks on the universality of human rights. Rather than promoting “traditional values”, Chinese authorities have argued that civil and political rights are long-term goals which must be preceded by economic development. In this regard, their international rationale for promoting a conception of human rights not based on universality mirrors their domestic messaging.

With the universality of human rights under attack from powerful states, civil society must double-down in its efforts to promote universalism. International standards, mechanisms, and norms are created within the international system by states. But, civil society must be prepared to push for universalism in human rights treaties and key resolutions to ensure positive narratives on this issue are maintained. We must work with like-minded states to ensure that a drift in language, such as using the term “European values”, does not inadvertently signal that human rights are not universal or that regional conceptions of human rights and values are acceptable or even desirable.

At the same time, international and local civil society must continue to report on the human rights records of states, particularly those which attack and undermine human rights. It is critical that evidence of human rights violations is documented and shared in order to challenge states’ human rights records and attempts to portray themselves as positive actors in human rights dialogues and decision-making. Civil society can also be a powerful voice pushing like-minded states to take action; calling for greater scrutiny of domestic human rights crises, and maintaining pressure on states.

Supporting & working alongside the network of Human Rights Houses, we have a lot to be proud of in 2021. Here are a few of the numbers that we're celebrating together:

The provision and predictability of core funding to civil society is more important than ever. Core funding, in the form of institutional grants, allows civil society organisations to swiftly adapt to rapidly changing local contexts.

Such adaptability and flexibility provides civil society the opportunity to be as responsive as possible to the needs of the communities in which they work. At the same time, core funding provides autonomy from donor-driven demands and opportunities to leverage new and additional resources as access to funding becomes restricted by governments in authoritarian and hybrid states.

Efforts to rollback human rights and threaten human rights defenders directly increase the very real need for core support to human rights organisations. Across HRHF’s priority region, authorities are erecting new and higher barriers to foreign and domestic funding for human rights organisations. Smear campaigns against human rights defenders and organisations lead to fewer contributions and donations from local sources. Legislative and other policy change across the region, particularly in hybrid states, require rapidly organised and robust advocacy responses from human rights organisations. New attacks on the freedoms of assembly, association, and expression also force human rights organisations to quickly adapt their engagement with local communities. Filling in funding gaps, advocating for human rights, and quickly addressing rapidly changing local human rights needs all require core support for human rights organisations.

Human Rights Houses benefit from the provision of core support. In Georgia, as the situation for human rights defenders worsened in 2021, Human Rights House Tbilisi adapted its work and launched a digital platform for human rights defenders. The website combines resources relevant for human rights defenders in Georgia and includes information on the protection of human rights defenders, funding and capacity building opportunities, and maps violations against HRDs in Georgia. The website also features human rights defenders from across the country, with the aim of raising awareness about the importance of the work of defenders and contributing to their positive image among the general population.

Since the launch of our Funding Civil Society report in 2017, calls for more core support to human rights organisations have only increased. Funding must be sustainable and seen as an investment in human rights. It must be flexible and allow recipient organisations to adapt to local needs. Funding should be used to foster collaboration amongst human rights organisations, rather than directly or indirectly fostering competition. Finally, donors must commit to prioritising the independence and security of human rights organisations.

HRHF contributes to and benefits from the number and strength of international coalitions of which we are a member.

Coalitions, partnerships, and networks which function effectively provide invaluable opportunities for solidarity, protection, legitimacy, and learning. When used and worked within effectively, they are tools for advancing real human rights change domestically and internationally.

The network of Human Rights Houses is our most important coalition and core to our work. In 2021, the network advocated for strengthened international and domestic human rights policies and supported human rights defenders at risk. Combatting efforts to restrict civic space remains a priority for the network of Human Rights Houses. Likewise, the network mobilises around human rights situations of particular concern for individual members, such as increasingly hostile environments for HRDs in Georgia. Of course, we also come together to raise the alarm when HRDs in the network are arbitrary detained and deprived of liberty, such as the case of volunteers and staff of Viasna, a member of the Barys Zvozskau Belarusian Human Rights House.

At the same time, bilateral activities of network members yield important projects and advancements for human rights. Letters from Lukashenka’s Prisons remains an important project to highlight the conditions of Belarusian political prisoners. The International Human Rights School for Young Activists is a key event for young people from Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Russia, Serbia, and Ukraine and organised in partnership with the Educational Human Rights House Chernihiv, Human Rights House Yerevan, Human Rights Belgrade, and Viasna Human Rights Centre.

The strength of the network lies in the expertise and legitimacy of these members. Public allegations against individuals associated with Human Rights House Voronezh (HRHV) in October 2020 prompted HRHF-supported external evaluations of the House. In June 2021, following the results of these evaluations, HRHF’s Board discontinued the membership of Human Rights House Voronezh due to Code of Conduct violations over an extended period of time.

Our partnerships beyond the network - such as with the Civic Solidarity Platform, Human Rights and Democracy Network, and HRC Net - can be long-term and focused on both policy and institutional advocacy. In other cases, we join or take leading roles in short-term coalitions to advance specific policy issues, such as advocating for an HRC-mandated Examination of human rights violations in Belarus, raising awareness of increasingly repressive actions of Russian authorities, addressing the growth in the use of strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs) across Europe, calling on the Nordic Council to strengthen its support for Belarusian human rights defenders and organisations, or supporting the Community of Democracies to engage with Armenian civil society.

In our Protecting Defenders report, HRHF made 10 recommendations to organisations providing protection for human rights defenders at risk and donors to improve existing protection infrastructure, strengthen the design and implementation of protection programmes, and expand communication with beneficiaries and stakeholders.

These are recommendations based on our empirical research as well as our experience in providing support to HRDs at risk. Throughout the year, we sought to incorporate these findings into our work at the same time that we provided protection assistance to over 500 defenders and their family members, including support to relocate to Ukraine, Lithuania, Poland and Georgia and continue their work when possible.

In 2021, we continued to invest in strategies to improve the network of Human Rights Houses’ protection infrastructure. Human Rights House Crimea and Human Rights House Yerevan joined our protection programme, bringing to five the number of Houses working together to support HRDs at risk. This will allow the programme to support greater numbers of HRDs at risk and provide additional countries for HRDs to go to should they need to flee.

Additionally, we looked for opportunities to strengthen the design and implementation of our protection programme. HRH Tbilisi created a fellowship programme for Belarusian HRDs, which has enabled 7 defenders at risk to continue their professional life from abroad. Educational HRH Chernihiv carried out online trainings and Internews Ukraine organised internships for Belarusian HRDs and journalists focusing on their integration into professional life in Ukraine. In addition to providing emergency support to defenders and organisations, the digital security team of the Belarusian HRH provided demand-driven technical assistance and rapid response consultations to human rights defenders, civil society activists and journalists. As many as 88 HRDs from Belarus benefited from psychological consultations offered by HRHF-supported network of certified psychologists.

At the same time, throughout 2021, we expanded communications with beneficiaries and stakeholders.  HRHF utilised our advocacy platform to raise the profile of those Belarusian members of the HRH network detained and facing lengthy prison sentences for their human rights work. We included names in statements made at the Human Rights Council and during Belarus’ UPR and lobbied for their inclusion in relevant resolutions considered at the Council as well as the PACE in Strasbourg. We led several joint civil society statements condemning the Belarusian authorities’ action and further raising the profile of HRDs in detention. We celebrated the recognition of Belarusian journalists by Fritt Ord's 2021 Free Media Award for which HRHF submitted successful nominations.

In late February 2022, significant global attention shifted to Russia’s renewed invasion of Ukraine. In fact, efforts over more than two decades laid the groundwork for Russian authorities to take such action.

Domestically, Russian authorities worked to stamp out opposition and dissenting voices and crackdown on the free exercise of fundamental freedoms. They employed the use of propaganda and pursued policies which traded political freedom for economic growth. Support for the regime subsequently grew. Internationally, Russia’s strategies have been to challenge the universality of human rights, promote national sovereignty, and employ bilateral realpolitik-based policies in order to avoid meaningful scrutiny of Russia’s human rights record.

In such situations, international civil society can play a critical role in advocating for greater scrutiny. We use strategies designed to engage decision-makers; raise public and stakeholder awareness; and, build the evidence base upon which advocacy for further action can be based.

At the UN, European Union, and Council of Europe, HRHF remained a key partner for dozens of States as we co-hosted events and proposed policy responses. At the same time, we recognised that action on the international or multilateral levels would require building political support in capitals. We directly lobbied members of national parliaments and foreign ministries across Europe and in the United States.

We sought to build public support for strengthened responses to the actions of the Russian authorities. This included authoring op-eds calling for greater European and American leadership on Russia as well as human rights to be at the centre of the EU’s strategic policy on Russia. We also utilised the publicity surrounding the 2021 Nobel Peace Prize award to Russian journalist Dmitry Muratov to issue op-eds highlighting the overall situation in Russia. We expanded our digital messaging on Russia and hosted Twitter chats and published regular content exploring the Russian human rights crisis.

In October 2021, we authored the report Crisis Point in Russia to serve as an advocacy tool calling for greater scrutiny and action by the international community. Crisis Point pointed to an environment for human rights defenders and organisations in Russia which is increasingly dire. We warned that Russian human rights trends are spilling - or being exported by the authorities - beyond Russia’s borders.

Countering Russia’s anti-human rights and anti-civil society objectives must remain a central tenet of the global human rights agenda. It will require policy solutions, such as strengthened accountability mechanisms, as well as protection and promotion of Russian human rights defenders and organisations and increased support to independent media and journalists. HRHF will continue to advocate for such interventions and work in partnership with the network of Human Rights Houses and beyond to do so.

We envision a world in which everyone can freely and safely promote and enjoy all human rights. Empowered human rights defenders and a strong civil society are key to this vision. That's why Human Rights Houses are at the core of our work.

Human Rights House Foundation establishes, supports, and connects Human Rights Houses – coalitions of civil society organisations working together to advance human rights at home and abroad. In 2021, 16 Houses in 11 countries were united in an international network of Human Rights Houses.

Human Rights House Foundation (HRHF) envisions a world in which everyone can freely and safely promote and enjoy all human rights. Empowered human rights defenders and a strong and independent civil society are key to this vision.

Human Rights House Foundation establishes, supports, and connects Human Rights Houses – coalitions of civil society organisations working together to advance human rights at home and abroad. Today, 16 Houses in 11 countries are united in an international network of Human Rights Houses.

Together, we advocate for the freedoms of assembly, association, and expression and the right to be a human rights defender. These four rights underpin a strong and independent civil society and protect and empower human rights defenders.

HRHF is an international non-profit organisation headquartered in Oslo with an office in Geneva and representation in Brussels and Tbilisi. HRHF holds consultative status at the United Nations and participatory status at the Council of Europe.

This financial data has been summarised from HRHF’s annual accounts.

For a complete copy of the annual accounts and the accompanying independent audit report click here.

For the fiscal year ending 31 December 2021, Human Rights House Foundation’s revenue totalled NOK 34 mln (EUR 3.3 mln).

We offer our sincere thanks for the generous financial support that we received from donors.

In 2021, our donors included the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Federal Department of Foreign Affairs of Switzerland, European Commission, Foreign Commonwealth & Development office of the United Kingdom, Foundation Open Society Institute, Nordisk Ministerråd, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic, and other donors.